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Abstract
A major shift toward open source software is underway. Companies are more
critically evaluating the cost effectiveness of their IT investments, seeing the benefits of
collaborative development, and looking for ways to avoid vendor lock-in. At the same
time, academics and industry visionaries are criticizing the use of a traditional
appropriation mechanism for innovation—the patent—by bemoaning the decisions of
U.S. and foreign governments to permit software patents, the rising numbers of patents
on software-related innovations (the so-called “arms race” build-up), and the cost and
frequency of patent litigation in the software industry. The critics generally have
applauded the shift towards open source, albeit for somewhat varying reasons.
This paper responds to those trends by analyzing the role of property rights in the
open source model, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of the appropriation
mechanisms that the open source model uses in lieu of intellectual property rights. I
make two main points. First, I argue that open source’s commercial success is
intertwined with its incorporation into traditional commercial value chains. What that
means is that open source cannot continue to grow in commercial importance without the
property rights that are necessary for firms to profit at other points of the value chain.
Second, I argue that despite open source’s distributed development process, open source
in the real world is likely to support an increasing concentration in the software industry.
The reason is that the proprietary firms best situated to exploit commercial interactions
with open source will be large firms, particularly large services firms. Smaller firms will
be less successful as services firms, and far less successful at exploiting the value-chain
interactions that have driven commercial open source.
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COMMERCIALIZING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE:
DO PROPERTY RIGHTS STILL MATTER?
I. Introduction
For several years now, open source software products have been gaining
prominence and market share. Yet it is not the products themselves that are provocative,
but the way in which they are developed and distributed. Two related features of the
model are distinctive: the use of collaborative development structures not contained
within the boundaries of a single firm, and the lack of reliance on intellectual property
rights as a means of appropriating the value of the underlying innovations. Firm-level
control of property is replaced by a complex set of informal and (sometimes) contractual
relations among strategic partners not joined by traditional firm boundaries. I argue here
that those relations reflect not coalescence towards industry norms driven solely by
superior output, but rather a series of strategic moves and countermoves that have had the
effect of opening some markets but closing others, substantially reducing profit margins,
and fostering consolidation of a traditionally fragmented industry.
I have written elsewhere about the role of intellectual property rights in
proprietary models of software development, where intellectual property rights are used
(albeit somewhat ineffectively) by firms to exploit the value of their internal R&D
investments. In that work, I generally reject the idea that the sheer number of patents is
creating a thicket that deters innovation, largely because of the positive evidence of a
robust startup market and because of the lack of evidence of any chilling of investment.
More generally, I have argued that many of the criticisms of software patents fail to
account for the apparent benefits those patents provide to smaller firms and focus much
too heavily on the transaction costs associated with the massive patent portfolios that the
larger industry participants have acquired (the so-called “arms race” build up).1
Open source development models work differently. Because open source
development proceeds on the premise that no individual or firm will have proprietary
control of the software, the firms participating in those development projects might have
little need for patents. The cooperative nature of development obviates any need for the
actual and implicit cross licensing that provides access to technology throughout the
proprietary software sector. The problem, however, is that the open source community
does not exist in a vacuum. It exists in a world in which participants in the industry are
building up large portfolios of patents, portfolios that pose a serious threat to open source
development. Therefore, any thorough analysis of the role of patents in the industry must
take account of the effects of the current property rights system on all participants. This
essay takes up that issue.

1

Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 Texas L. Rev. 961 (2005);
Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Startups (unpublished 2005
manuscript).

1

2

Open Source and Property Rights

February 16, 2006 Draft

In a nutshell, the problem is that open source developers can (and often do)
operate outside of the IP licensing framework that dominates the software industry.
Thus, many participants have no patents of their own with which they might protect
themselves in IP litigation. At the same time, at least some portions of this community
have developed software with a cavalier attitude to the possibility of patent infringement.
Those two habits cannot coexist in the long run. If the existing legal framework is not to
be abandoned, then the major open source developers must acquire patents of their own
or they must gain shelter from the patent portfolios held by those that participate in the
proprietary structure.
That raises the question, in turn, whether the potential for high-quality software
development through the open source model justifies eradication of software patents for
the entire software industry. To put it another way, one potential cost of permitting ready
enforcement of software patents is the potential disabling of the open source model. At
the same time, a sensible policy analysis must consider the possibilities for the
entrepreneurs and small firms struggling to find a foothold in the industry. Because the
property rights that patents offer are closely connected with the survival and success of
those firms, we must look more closely at the role property rights play in open source
before deciding that the need to free open source from the constraints of patents justifies
abandoning patents in the industry entirely. Yet it is difficult to analyze that problem
definitively in the absence of any objective evidence that would quantify the benefits of
open source development or the benefits that the commercial software industry derives
from IP.
The problem becomes more difficult when one considers the rapid convergence of
commercial and open source licensing models—so that even proprietary companies now
often allow access to source code2 and the prominent open source licenses discussed
below regularly permit commercial development of proprietary works derived from the
covered products. A complete answer must account for the effects of those licenses on
the character of financial investment in open source software. For example, as I discuss
below, the restrictions in common open source licenses might tend to tilt the scales in
favor of proprietary investments in service firms rather than products firms. If, as seems
likely, it is more difficult for startups entering the industry to compete in services sectors
than in product sectors, this suggests in turn that the spread of open source software in
fact could promote concentration in the software industry.
In this essay, I analyze the role of patent rights in commercialized open source
development models—that is, development models that are part of business models
centered on increasing shareholder returns. Section II sets the stage with a brief
description of the landscape of the industry and of the licenses on which open source
development depends. Section III considers open source as a challenge to the “one-shop”
model of proprietary software development, explaining how and why firms in some cases
might profit from collaborative development through open source instead of wholly oneshop proprietary development. Finally, Section IV considers the relation between open
2

For Microsoft’s program, see http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/default.mspx.
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source and the direction and location of innovation in the industry. I write from the
perspective that open source will tend to support innovation by larger and betterestablished firms than wholly proprietary development, which is a model that is at least
relatively more accessible to startup and younger firms.
A Note on Sources
My account of the industry is based on four sources. The first three are publicly
available. First, I have reviewed the existing literature, which includes several serious
efforts to analyze the industry.3 Second, I have read widely in news accounts related to
the open source community. Third, to understand how the licenses in the industry
actually work, I have studied the texts of the actual licenses with considerable care.
Although some scholars have noted the important distinctions in these licenses,4 the
literature generally has failed to consider a link between the specific terms of licenses and
the business models that are best suited to using those licenses.
The most important source, however, has been a series of in-depth interviews and
site visits at a variety of large and small firms engaged with the open source development
model. I have spoken with executives at firms as large as IBM and Microsoft, and also at
smaller startup firms and venture capitalists. Because of the sensitive nature of the topics
addressed in these interviews, I have adopted a different technique for collecting
information than in my previous work. Specifically, contrary to my normal practice, I
did not tape or transcribe the interviews, but rather limited myself to detailed
contemporaneous notes. I was free to ask any questions I liked. Because of the sensitive
nature of the topics at issue here, and because I thought it important to obtain access to
frank opinions from executives at large companies, I adopted a much more restrictive
framework than has been customary in the interviews for my earlier work. Specifically,
the interviews for this project were conducted on the understanding that (I) I would not
identify the specific individuals to whom I spoke; (II) I would emphasize that the
interviewees expressed their personal views rather than the views of the firms by which
they were employed (I emphasize that point here); (III) my notes of the conversations
would remain confidential; and (IV) I would not attribute any specific quotations to
employees of a particular firm. Because several of the firms were generous enough to
give me access to high-ranking executives with decision-making authority related to the
subject, I believe that the information from those interviews is uniquely valuable in
developing a nuanced understanding of the relation between proprietary and open source
3

For my purposes, the most noteworthy are Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source (2004); Lawrence
Rosen, Open Source Licensing: Software Freedom and Intellectual Property Law (2004); Josh Lerner &
Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond (Harvard NOM Research
Paper No. 04-35); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, forthcoming J. L. &
Econ. (2005) [hereinafter Lerner & Tirole, Scope of Licensing]; Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in
the Public Domain, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183 (2004); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and
Intellectual Property Policy, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 534 (2003).
4

Particularly Rosen, supra note 3, Weber, supra note 3, and Ieuan G. Mahony & Edward J. Naughton,
Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and into Big Business, Computer & Internet Lawy.,
Oct. 2004, at 1.
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methods of development. I am confident that I would not have been able to obtain that
information by surveys or by formal on-the-record interviews.
Of course, this does raise the possibility of bias, either in reporting the
information from my notes or in selecting firms for interviews. For this type of project,
perhaps the most that can be said is that I was sensitive to those problems as I reviewed
my notes in preparing this manuscript and selected the interview base. In the end,
however difficult it might be to replicate this information, I think it is fair to say that it
does fall squarely within the relevant methodological tradition in the social sciences.
Thus, I think the concerns with replicability go to the weight to be ascribed to the
information, rather than its usefulness or validity.5

II. The Landscape
A basic understanding of the development and current state of the software
industry provides a necessary backdrop to the analytical questions on which this essay
focuses. Thus, I start with a broad outline of each model and the core terms of the
licenses that shape them.
A. The Proprietary Software Model
1. Formation and Maturation of the Proprietary Software Industry
The software industry formed in the mid-1960s when labor shortages made it
increasingly difficult for increasingly complex software to be produced in-house by each
computer user as needed.6 Sales of software products grew rapidly throughout the 1970s,
and by the 1980s, the United States had a large and well-developed software industry
with more than one thousand firms.7
The industry is comprised of two sectors: products and services.8 The products
sector further divides into primarily two markets, one for sales to individuals and the
other to businesses (called enterprise software).9 The enterprise software market, in turn,

5

For general discussion of this sort of qualitative empirical methodology, see Irving Seidman,
Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences (2d
ed. 1998); Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed. 2002).

6

Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software
Industry (2003).
7

Campbell-Kelly, supra note 6; Michael A. Cusumano, The Business of Software (2004); Vernon W.
Ruttan, Technology, Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation Perspective (2001)
8

Although the general distinction between products and services firms draws on Cusumano, supra note 7,
the further breakdown in this paragraph is my own.
9

A small number of products firms earn revenues in other ways. For example, firms that develop search
technology typically rely heavily on advertising revenues.
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includes products aimed at software designers and developers,10 products targeted
directly to end users,11 and products targeted to hardware developers.12 The services
sector is less structured and includes everything from outsourcing the entire IT function,
to maintenance contracts, to custom software design, to hosted applications delivered via
a web browser. In the last case, the main difference from the license of a prepackaged
software product may be that between an upfront license fee and a periodic rental or
access fee.
Though firms in the two sectors rely on substantially different business models,
the line that separates them is a shifting one. To simplify a complex pattern, it is
reasonably accurate to say that products firms are characterized by higher operating
margins, higher growth rates, and less stable market shares, whereas services firms have
lower operating margins and lower growth rates, but can more readily establish stable
market positions.13 From that perspective, the typical products firm is characterized by
high-volume sales of non-customized products that customers can use “off the shelf” with
little or no assistance. At the other end of the spectrum are services firms, which generate
revenues by helping firms to install, design, and maintain software. In between is a large
group of hybrid firms, which generally started by attempting to sell products, but were
subsequently forced by market conditions to provide ever-increasing levels of
customization, thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a pure high-margin
product.14
As a whole, a remarkable lack of concentration characterizes the software
industry. The industry’s CR4 ratio is only 39%, and its HHI is less than 600 (where an
HHI of 1000 or more qualifies an industry as only moderately concentrated).15 Census
Bureau statistics report more than forty thousand firms in the industry as of 2000.16

10

Examples would include web development tools, graphics tools, server software, operating systems,
firmware and many others.

11

These products are likely to be marketed through value-added resellers, channel distributors, system
integrators, or independent vendors, and include database programs, office suites, and various vertical
industry applications.

12

Examples here would include the various operating systems and simpler programs developed for
integration into the increasingly varied array of electronic devices that rely on computer processing.

13

Also, as I show in a forthcoming paper with John Allison and Abe Dunn, products firms are more likely
to use patents than services firms.

14

This paragraph summarizes the basic argument of Cusumano, supra note 7.

15

The industry “CR4” is the “concentration ratio” of, or percentage of total market sales accounted for by,
the top 4 software firms. The HHI measures concentration by summing the squares of the individual
market shares of all participants. These figures are calculated based on the 2002 software sales figures for
the Software 500. They overstate industry concentration to the extent that they ignore software sales by
firms outside the Software 500. Conversely, concentration figures would be much higher if the industry
were broken down into smaller sectors.

16

I aggregate data from NAICS 5112 (Software Publishers) and 541511 (Custom Computer Programming
Services).
The data are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E54151.HTM and
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E5112.HTM (both last visited on Oct. 7, 2003).
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Nearly five hundred firms in the industry had a million or more dollars in sales in 2003,
even after the contractions in the industry at the turn of the millennium.17 As I discuss in
Section IV, the lack of concentration has considerable implications for the competitive
structure of the industry and its openness to innovation.
The lack of concentration is attributable largely to low barriers to entry. Firms
typically enter and exit with great frequency.18 This pattern interacts in a distinct way
with the sector designations described above. As the venture capital model that supports
most new firms that enter the industry better suits products firms than service firms,19
products firms are more likely to be the startups receiving financing. New services firms,
although not unheard of, are less common and tend to evolve naturally from incumbent or
rising product firms adapting to market pressures.
2. Software Licensing under Proprietary Models
An important feature of the evolutionary tension between products firms and
services firms is the treatment of source code. Traditionally, hybrid or services firms that
sold custom-designed products provided the source code to the user, but with restrictions
designed to prevent its further disclosure. However, for prepackaged products, until
about 1990, standard license agreements generally did not make the source code available
at all. This led to an increasing compatibility problem between software and hardware
components because other software developers did not have access to each other’s source
code.20
The rise of the Internet and network computing, both of which have increased the
technical complexity of software by orders of magnitude, exacerbated the interoperability
problem. This is particularly true for infrastructure and enterprise products, as opposed
to end-user applications, which tend to be easier to install). The commoditization of
“middleware” products,21 which made custom software less dominant in that space, also
drove the importance of easy compatibility; it is difficult to sell a commodity that does
not easily interact with commodity products that provide associated functionality. The
complexity underscored the need for transparency in software design, as many

17

http://www.softwaremag.com/sw500 (last visited May 6, 2004).

18

In 2002, 209 firms received their first round of venture capital financing, receiving a combined total of
$872 million (an average of more than $4 million for each firm) during a markedly down year. During
2002, 652 software companies received a total of $4.3 billion (that is, 443 firms received second or
subsequent rounds during 2002). Since 1995, 2907 new firms have received venture capital financing.
2003 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 40. Similarly, the industry’s index of substantial
operating firms (the Software 500) shows a major turnover each year: there have been about 1100 distinct
firms in the Software 500 in the last five years.

19

Mann & Sager, supra note 1; see also Cusumano, supra note 7.

20

This paragraph and the paragraphs that follow reflect background information derived from
conversations with software executives over the last several years.

21

By middleware, I refer loosely to software that operates as an intermediary between different
applications, such as web servers, applications servers, database management systems, and the like.
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sophisticated users increasingly began to desire not only a functional software product
but also a product that users might be able to understand, replicate, and modify.
Thus, there is a strong market-based need for collaboration in the development of
“platform” products, which serve as the backbone of a user’s entire system. Although
there obviously was competition among firms to own the “platform,”22 a one-firm
platform would present the long-term problem of slowed technological innovation, as that
firm’s interests naturally would conflict with those of the other firms attempting to
provide products and services on the platform.
Theoretically, a workable method for top-down articulation of platform standards
or interfaces could have sidestepped the problem. That has not happened, however. One
central difficulty is that the industry has not been able to reach a consensus on the relation
between patents and standards. Some groups advocate the adoption of standards that will
reliably be patent-free, hoping to avoid the possibility that a patentee can tax any
substantial portion of standard-based Internet activity. As it happens, however, patented
technology has been knowingly adopted into standards in some cases, and there have
been several notable incidents where patents were discovered after a standard was
implemented.23
Others advocate the mandatory licensing of intellectual property rights
incorporated into standards. They recognize the difficulty (which should be clear from
the discussion below) of establishing a property-preempted zone in which to articulate
standards. Even on that issue, however, stakeholders dispute whether the licenses,
besides being “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND), must also be royalty free.
The most prominent organization, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), has
generally taken the view that those that participate in a standards process must contribute
their patents royalty-free.24 That approach, however, has the potential to drive patentees
from the process, which in turn could deprive the resulting standards of the best
technology available. Moreover, if the adopted standard turns out to infringe an essential
patent of a departed patentee, then that party could refuse to license its patent entirely or
impose unreasonable terms and conditions on those seeking to implement the standard.
Thus, many patentees in the industry instead insist that a better approach is to permit a

22

For a theoretical discussion of the economics of that problem, see Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in
Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615 (2000). It is a common topic of competitive
concern among the executives to whom I have spoken.

23

Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards: The Risks to
Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 95 (2002).

24

For discussion, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 303-11. OASIS recently revised its patent policy to
accommodate
but
not
require
royalty-free
licenses.
(http://www.oasisopen.org/who/intellectualproperty.php). Even the W3C policy permits royalties through an “opt-out”
provision. See http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205 (section 7).
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standard to incorporate patents licensed on a RAND basis even if it is not fully royaltyfree.25
More recently, cost pressures have given open-source products an important
market entry point. To date, that entry point has been in the commercial market, for
several reasons. Among other things, those products are attractive because of their ability
(discussed in more detail below) to facilitate lower hardware costs by preventing vendor
lock-in.26 It is also certainly important that sophisticated enterprises are more willing to
take a risk on a potentially complex installation and integration process.27 The early
dissemination and widespread adoption of Linux and Apache – both free and of
demonstrated quality – exemplified these bases for accepting open source products. In
contrast, open source has made much more limited inroads in the consumer space. This
is true, at least in part, because Microsoft’s existing products are much less risky for the
typical consumer to install and integrate, yet still offer considerable quality in comparison
to existing open-source alternatives.

25

This paragraph and the preceding one summarize the views of executives in interviews by the author.

26

See
Eric
S.
Raymond,
The
Magic
Cauldron
(2000),
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/magic-cauldron/index.html.

27

A point emphasized in interviews.
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3. Cross-Licensing: the Proprietary Equilibrium
As I have explained elsewhere,28 the widespread use of cross licensing of patented
technologies is a key feature of the mature proprietary software development model. The
increasing complexity and interdependence of innovation in the industry has made it
important for all of the major firms to have access to the intellectual property of the other
major firms in the industry. It is likely that many of the most important firms are
developing and selling products that at least arguably infringe in some way on patents
held by several other major players in the industry. The major firms could test the
relative strengths of their portfolio through litigation, but instead have chosen for the
most part to enter into a web of cross-licensing agreements. Under those agreements
(whether formal and explicit or informal and tacit), most of the large firms generally have
access to all of the intellectual property held by most of the other large firms. Thus, those
firms for the most part compete against each other based on the strength of their product
design and marketing, not on the strength of their IP portfolios.29
B. The Open Source Development Model
1. The Rise of Open Source
One development mitigating the tension created by the proprietary licensing
model (i.e., the demand/need for source code and resistance to providing it) has been the
rise of platform products that are distributed with their source code. Given the practical
difficulties of distributing source code with products in a way that ensures that the code
will remain confidential, it is perhaps not surprising that the source code is made
available not only to the paying users but also to other developers and users at large.
To understand the property rights at issue, it is important to distinguish two stages
of an open source project. First, in the contribution stage, dispersed communities of
programmers produce lines of code that they contribute to a particular development
project. Typically, the copyright in the contributed code rests either with the contributor
or with one of several non-profit entities (such as the Free Software Foundation) that
acquires the copyright through assignment. Where the copyright is not assigned, the
contributor typically licenses the code to the project under the relevant license.30 Second,
in the distribution stage, the software product is distributed under the terms of an open
28

Mann, supra note 1.

29

The strength of the IP portfolios is not irrelevant. IBM, for instance, earns a great deal from licensing
fees of its portfolio, which plainly is the strongest in the industry. Thus, other firms have an incentive to
increase the strength of their portfolios to lower the net sums they must expend on cross-licensing
agreements. This effect, however, is relatively indirect, largely because most of the cross-licensing
agreements apparently do not involve a transfer of monetary consideration. {The agreements are
proprietary, but interviews my suggest (with the notable exception of IBM) the general lack of monetary
consideration.}

30

As discussed below, this can create difficulties when those operating the project later wish to alter the
license under which the product is distributed (to “reversion” it, in the typical jargon), because they are
likely to need consent from original contributors.
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source license. This license restricts the rights of the user in the code (more on that
subject in the sections that follow). If the leaders of the project wish for the software to
be regarded as “open source,” they must select a form of license certified as an open
source license by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).31
As a method of software production, open source in fact dates to the earliest days
of commercial computing, when businesses using IBM computers in the early 1950’s
collaborated on the task of designing software for their machines.32 The modern history
of open source, however, begins with the birth of UNIX in 1969. Starting from a few
months of programming by Ken Thompson at his California home, UNIX developed into
a widely used and respected operating system that has become the ultimate source of
many of the most successful operating systems in use today.33
For purposes of this essay, the most important of the open source projects is
GNU, begun by Richard Stallman in 1984 as an effort to create an operating system that
would include the benefits of the UNIX operating system but include sufficiently new
code to avoid the ownership questions that plagued the distribution of UNIX for decades.
GNU became a viable operating system when Linus Torvalds contributed a working
kernel to the project in 1994, at which point the software came to be known as
GNU/Linux (or confusingly, just Linux). From that point, the Linux operating system
has evolved through a rapid collaborative process in which a large, worldwide
community of programmers routinely read, redistribute and modify the source code to
improve it. It is subject to the General Public License (GPL), one of the earliest, most
widely used, and most restrictive of the open source licenses.34
The rise of large-scale open source development was facilitated by the birth of the
commercial Internet, which has substantially lowered the costs and logistical complexity
of transferring information and coordinating programming processes among remote
individuals. To that extent, the comparative advantage of the corporate structure as a
device for organizing sophisticated research has been challenged by the rise of modern
computer-based techniques of collaboration.
As the discussion above suggests, open source holds its greatest promise for
platform products. For one thing, the market need is greatest for platform products,
because of the importance of a reliable promise that vendor lock-in will not endanger the

31

The Open Source Initiative is a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by Bruce Perens and Eric
Raymond. Generally, it supports a broader conception of open source software, more tolerant of
commercial interaction, than the Free Software Foundation. For my purposes, the most important of its
activities is its promulgation of the Open Source Definition, the generally accepted indicator that a
particular license should be regarded as “open source.” For details, visit www.opensource.org.

32

Campbell-Kelly, supra note 6.

33

Weber, supra note 3, at 20-53.

34

Weber, supra note 3, at 54-55, 94-109.
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survival of products built (or modified) on the software stack above that platform.35 For
another, it is generally more important in ensuring interoperability to have access to the
source code of platform products (on which middleware and applications must be
stacked) than it is of higher-end applications. For yet another, collaborative development
has its highest potential in those areas, where firms specializing in different parts of a
value chain have joint incentives to participate in the development of a high-quality
product that is broadly accessible. In that context, open source traditionally has been
linked to powerful brands, like Linux, Apache, and Perl. Still, some of the modern open
source products have moved beyond that niche. The Firefox web browser, for example,
is a product gaining recent popularity36 that is not, at least in its current manifestations,
primarily a platform product.37
Some of those programs are created almost entirely through the efforts of
volunteers,38 as in the early days of Linux. Even now, it probably still is true that most of
the important projects have roots in self-organizing collaborative activity, even if the
projects have come to be nurtured and sustained in their maturity by proprietary firms.
Still, there has been something of a shift toward proprietary involvement in the initiation
of projects. Thus, in recent years proprietary companies have tried – albeit with varying
levels of success – to jump-start projects with a release of formerly proprietary code as
open source software. Examples here include Netscape’s release of its browser source
code in 1998 to form the basis of Mozilla,39 IBM’s 2004 release of Cloudscape to the
Apache Foundation, and Sun’s recent release of the source code for Solaris 10. In still
another model, firms fund the development of new projects through a combination of
paying employees and sponsoring volunteers to produce products that achieve their goals.
Leading examples here would be JBoss and MySQL.
The availability of venture financing – or lack thereof – affects the way in which
open source firms enter the market. As discussed in more detail below, it is difficult to
obtain financing for a product that will be distributed without charge, for which the
35

Vendor lock-in seems to be a particular concern for government procurement. K.D. Simon, The Value of
Open Standards and Open-Source Software in Government Environments, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 227 (2005).

36

After releasing several browsers that did not succeed in the market for various reasons, in November
2004, the Mozilla Foundation released Firefox (using second-generation Netscape code). Firefox has been
an immediate success. As of August 2005, it is estimated that Firefox has an 8% share of the browser
market, compared to 87% for IE and 2% for Safari. Juan Carlos Perez, Firefox Market Share Slips, PC
WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, available at www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,122213,00.asp.

37

To be sure, the rise of “mash-ups” and similar services suggests at least a possibility that the Firefox
browser (or some competitor) ultimately will become a major platform for distributed applications. See
Elinor Mills, Mapping a Revolution with ‘Mashups’, CNET News.com, Nov. 17, 2005, available at
http://news.com.com/Mapping+a+revolution+with+mashups/2009-1025_3-5944608.html; Ryan Singel,
Oct.
6,
2005,
available
at
Are
You
Ready
for
Web
2.0,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,69114,00.html.
38

Sourceforge.net lists tens of thousands of open source projects. However, it seems likely that only a few
of those projects have any significant impact on IT. See Lerner & Tirole, Scope of Licensing, supra note 3
(analyzing SourceForge data).

39

The Mozilla Foundation received startup financing from Netscape in 2003.
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source code will remain open if the product succeeds, and which (like all software
products) may never succeed for technical or market-based reasons. Thus, to the extent it
has been available at all, venture financing traditionally has appeared after the open
source product is distributed, modified, and already become a market success. For
example, when developers at the University of Cambridge developed Xen (software that
lets hardware run multiple operating systems) and distributed it openly through two
versions, they were then able to form a firm, XenSource, with $6 million of venture
backing. That financing was used, in turn, to support work on a third version of the
product, the distribution of professional releases tailored for different environments, and
product support. The notable point, though, is that the innovative activity preceded the
financing. This contrasts starkly with the financing model for firms pursuing proprietary
software strategies, where little or no development or deployment is likely to occur
before first financing.40
Perhaps the most conceptually difficult aspect of the open source development
model lies in the way that successful open source projects foster a vibrant and active
community of contributors. As many others have recognized, a key part of any such
project is designing it in a way that will attract talented and motivated individuals to the
project.41 Generally, the existing literature has focused on how to tap into altruistic
motivations for individual participants that may be attracted to participation in a
communitarian endeavor.42 Yet, it is clear that long-time participants in the open-source
community experience the success of commercial models founded on open-source
community with distaste, feeling that their work is being co-opted by profit-seeking
investors and managers.43 The trends discussed in this essay can only exacerbate that
problem.
From my perspective, the need to maintain a community that is attractive to
individuals is not a serious problem with the development model. It is simply one feature
that affects the way in which projects are designed. For example, it is clear from
interviews that the most perceptive proprietary firms that sponsor open source projects
will continue to be successful at coordinating their proprietary activities with open source
communities that will be interested in participating.44 For example, IBM’s recent
donation of the Cloudscape database was governed by an Apache license, at least in part
because IBM’s working relationship with that community gave IBM confidence not only
40

Mann & Sager, supra note 1.

41

Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Eric
S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (1999).
42

Justin Pappas Johnson, Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good, 11 J. ECONOMICS &
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 637 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Raymond, supra note 26.
43

E.g., Bruce Perens, The Emerging Economic Paradigm of Open Source, First Monday, Oct. 3, 2005,
available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/special10_10/.
44

For a detailed discussion of how to integrate collaborative development into a proprietary firm, see A.
Neus & P. Scherf, Opening Minds: Cultural Change with the Introduction of Open-Source Collaboration
Methods, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 215 (2005).
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that individuals working in that community would have the skills necessary to make the
program successful.45 It also was important that the relation between that project and
other Apache-related projects would make the work sufficiently interesting to attract
those individuals into the development community.
2. The Current State of Open Source: Commercialization
The events of the last few years show that the ties between open source
communities and large incumbent (proprietary) firms are growing rapidly. Thus, for
example, it is plain that a substantial share of the important Linux contributors now has
gainful employment either directly for OSDL or for one of its major supporters.46
Indeed, the location of such a high share of the “important” contributors in such posts is
one of the reasons OSDL executives have been optimistic about their ability to obtain
consent from enough of those contributors to succeed in reversioning the GPL.47
Moreover, dual-licensing firms (like MySQL) generally employ directly almost all of
those that contribute to their projects. As the interview subjects explain, those firms can
simply reject any substantial blocks of code submitted by individuals that are not
interested in employment with the company. The increasing ties between proprietary
firms and open source projects illustrate how far the open source development model has
evolved from the UNIX-hacker days of the 1970s.
It is harder to get a sense of the relation between open source and small firms.
Although some of the interviewees suggest that there are a “huge number” of startups
building on Linux, it is not clear what to make of that perspective. Using VentureXpert, I
found only 131 firms (substantially all of which were founded after 1998) whose business
descriptions contain the terms “Linux,” “Apache” or “open source.” By any standard,
that is a small sector of the software startup market. By comparison, for example, more
than 200 new software firms received their first financing in 2002 alone.48 Moreover,
few of those 131 firms are actually profiting directly from open source technology. For
example, many simply offer heterogeneous (or cross-platform) operating system support,
including Linux or Windows,49 or provide proprietary applications that can be used on

45

For similar accounts of IBM efforts at developing open-source communities, see B. Alpern et al., The
Jikes Research Virtual Machine Project: Building an Open-Source Research Community, 44 IBM
SYSTEMS J. 399 (2005) (Jalapeno); J. Becking et al., MMBase: An Open-Source Content Management
System, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 381 (2005) (MMBase).
46

See Daniel Lyons, Peace, Love, and Paychecks, Forbes, Sept. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0920/180.html/ (discussing corporate sponsorship of key Linux
contributors).
47

See also Keith Regan, Browser Rumors Renewed as Google Hires Firefox Programmer, E-Commerce
Times, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/40015.html (Google hires
developer responsible for Firefox browser).
48

For comparison, in 2002 alone more than 200 new firms received more than $850 million in financing.

49

I would include here firms like Mission Critical Linux.
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either a Windows or Linux platform,50 or on occasion proprietary applications that can be
used only on a Linux platform.51
Some of the most interesting startups are not making open source products, but
rather are strategically capitalizing on the tension between proprietary and open source
development models. Black Duck and Palamida, for example, are two start-up firms that
make software designed to assist the commingling of open source and proprietary
technology. Several firms sell technology designed to link computers of different
operating systems.52 Open Source Risk Management, for another example, sells legal
protection against copyright and patent infringement litigation related to open source
products.53 Finally, some of those firms (like Red Hat, Covalent Technologies, MySQL,
JBoss, and formerly SCO Group) are distributors of so-called “professional” open source
products, special proprietary or quasi-proprietary versions of traditional open source
products.
That is not to say that it is impossible to have a successful venture-backed startup
with a purely open-source product. For example, MontaVista Software has been gaining
considerable traction in the production of cutting-edge operating systems for embedded
devices and cell phones. Currently, it is obtaining license fees for purely open-source
operating systems, based almost entirely on its ability to promise speed to the market.
With little copyright or patent protection against duplication of its products, that is a
difficult route, but it may not be an impossible one.
Another possibility is to start with open source code as the platform on which to
build a proprietary product. Several venture capitalists to whom I have spoken suggest
that this type of startup is increasingly common.54 The basic expectation here is that the
startups will build proprietary products around the open-source cores, and that the opensource nature of the core will make it easier for the startup to integrate its work with the
core. As time goes on, it well may be that this will become an increasingly common
method for the development of proprietary software. However, that development is still
at an early stage. For now at least, an open source foundation is probably still likely to be
an obstacle to sophisticated venture-backed financing.

50

Altiris, Atempo, and PERSIST Technologies.

51

Aduva, Eazel, Eternal Systems, Qlusters, and Scalix.

52

Cassatt, Centrify, Steeleye Technology, and Vintela.

53

There are other firms that are not focusing on open risk management per se, but that are capitalizing on
the lack of interoperability between open source and proprietary operating systems. CodeWeavers, for
example, offers a software product that facilitates the use of Windows applications on Linux. That product
is a “professional” version of the “free software” Wine Project.

54

See also Martin LaMonica, Open Source, Open Wallet, CNet, Nov. 7, 2005 (discussing VC investments
in open-source related startups).
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3. Software Products Licenses under Open Source Models
At the center of all of this is the license that governs the use of the code. Before a
license can qualify as an open source license, it must have OSI certification. To become
certified, the license must meet a set of basic, bare minimum requirements, designed to
ensure that software is distributed with its source code and that it be reasonably available
without constraint to developers and users that wish to use it or modify it for their own
purposes.55 Again, those requirements are not logically necessary to solve the
interoperability and transparency problems discussed above. A proprietary developer
could arguably achieve the same ends with an aggressive program of sharing source code
with developers and major customers. Indeed, Microsoft’s shared source program is
designed to address that problem.56 Yet the absence of any response to those issues
throughout the 1990’s played a major role in the rise of open source. Moreover, a shared
source program cannot solve the concerns about vendor lock-in that motivate many
enterprises to choose open rather than proprietary platforms.
Thus, the open source communities’ awareness of those issues has led to their
establishment of a baseline expectation, embodied in the OSI requirements, that must
now be met before any project can take advantage of the formal and informal
infrastructure that has arisen to support open source development. Beyond those basic
requirements, however, the licenses differ in a number of ways that are important for
understanding their effect on commercial development of the licensed software.57 For the
present discussion, the licenses differ most importantly in three ways: (a) the constraints
on incorporation of the licensed code in later products; (b) the rules about the

55

As set forth at www.opensource.org, Version 1.9 of the Open Source Definition includes the following
requirements: free redistribution must be tolerated; inclusion of source code; the creation and distribution
of derivative works must be tolerated; the license cannot discriminate against particular users or fields of
endeavor; rights under the license must extend to all users whether or not they have executed a formal
license; the license cannot be restricted to use of the program as part of a specific product; the license
cannot restrict other software solely because it is distributed with the licensed software; and the license
must be technology-neutral.
56

See http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/default.mspx.

57

An interesting problem that warrants further inquiry is why open source licenses continue to proliferate.
See Rosen, supra note 3, at 235-38. It would make more sense for a relatively small number of standard
forms to begin to dominate, but it continues to be the case that new projects often result in newly developed
licenses, like the new Community Development and Distribution License Sun devised for its Solaris
contribution. Historically, the classic licenses like the GPL, LGPL, BSD, and MIT licenses dominated
significant projects until the late 1990’s, but starting with the release of Mozilla in 1998 the number of
licenses approved by OSI has increased rapidly. As I write, 58 separate licenses have been approved. This
problem has gained increasing attention in recent years, largely because of the increasing difficulty of
combining software code written within different licensing domains. The underlying fear is not so much
that a particular project (like Linux) will split into separate projects, or fork, as it is that the open source
community as a whole will become a number of effectively separate gated communities. Rosen, supra note
3, at 247-53.
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contribution of IP rights related to contributed code; and (c) the rules about enforcement
of IP rights by users of the software.58
The first has traditionally been the major point of differentiation among open
source licenses. Here, there is a readily discernible continuum, from fully “reciprocal”
licenses (like the GPL) at the one end to “academic” licenses (like the BSD) at the other.
The oft-debated § 2(b) of the GPL, for example, provides that its restrictions must apply
not only to the original GPL code but also to any “modified work” that includes GPL
code unless “identifiable sections” of the modified work “can be reasonably considered
independent and separate works in themselves.” Thus, the license reflects a concept of
reciprocal obligation. If a developer wants to take advantage of the contributions
reflected in an existing piece of GPL code, the developer is free to do so, provided that
the developer makes a reciprocal contribution of the developer’s modifications into the
GPL model.59 The scope of restrictions imposed by that provision is debatable,60 but it
certainly imposes at least some constraint on the ability of a developer to incorporate
GPL code into a fully proprietary product.61
At the other end of the spectrum, the so-called “academic” licenses like the BSD
license impose no similar constraints on distribution, requiring only that distributors
include the code and give appropriate credit. The concept of those licenses is that work
prepared solely for academic purposes should be freely available to the entire community
to use as it sees fit with no strings attached.62 Thus, for example, Microsoft easily can
(and does) include some BSD code in its operating system. Other major licenses have an
effect similar to the BSD license, though they state it more explicitly. The Mozilla Public
License (MPL), for example, states in § 3.7:

58

This section draws heavily on the terminology and analysis of Rosen, supra note 3.

59

I do not address here the question whether the licenses are binding as a matter of contract or through
rules of property rights. On that point, Peggy Radin has suggested that the property rights argument is
quite weak. The absence of robust mechanisms for execution similarly undermines the idea that they
operate by creating contractual obligations. Of course, because the right to use the software is likely to
depend on the existence of a license, the absence of any contractual obligation will be important only in
cases when stopping subsequent use is not an adequate remedy. The main example of this is likely to be in
the enforcement of provisions that purport to govern enforcement of patent rights by users of the software.

60

For contrasting evaluations, compare, e.g., James V. Delong, The Enigma of Open Source Software
(Version 1.0) (unpublished 2004 manuscript) (a highly expansive interpretation) with Rosen, supra note 3
(a much narrower interpretation).
61

Typical reciprocity provisions apply only when the work is “distributed.” GPL § 2(b). With the rise of
application service providers, that leaves a loophole that would permit commercial exploitation of a
derivative work without distribution. Accordingly, newer licenses extend the reciprocity provision to
include any “external deployment” of the derivative work that makes the work available to users over a
computer network. See, e.g., Apple Public Source License § 2.2; Real Networks Public Source License §
1.7; Open Software License § 5. See also Rosen, supra note 3, at 193-95.

62

The concept behind that license resonates strongly with the academic community of motivation and
intellectual contribution, as discussed in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and
Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1988).
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You may create a Larger Work by combining Covered Code with
other code not governed by the terms of this License and distribute
the Larger Work as a single product. In such a case, You must
make sure the requirements of this License are fulfilled for the
Covered Code.
{Sun’s new Common Development and Distribution License (the CDDL), which governs
its contribution of Solaris, includes a substantially identical provision (§ 3.6).} Similarly,
the Apache License (Version 2.0) provides in § 4: “You may reproduce and distribute
copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without
modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You [give recipients a copy of
the license, include “prominent notices” of your changes, and include appropriate
attribution notices].”
The second crucial point of differentiation among the licenses is the coverage of
intellectual property rights held by those that contribute to the project. The traditional
practice has been to rely on the understanding that any party that contributed to an open
source project would grant an implied license that permitted ordinary uses of the resulting
software. Licenses like the GPL63 and the BSD that do not explicitly deal with the
problem must rely on that concept.64 Recent licenses deal with the subject more directly,
including specific copyright and patent licenses from all contributors to all users.65
Indeed, the Apache Software Foundation has developed a separate Apache Contributor
License Agreement designed specifically to respond to this problem.66
For this discussion, what is most interesting about those licenses is the care with
which they limit the patent rights that the contributor grants. For example, § 2.1 of the
Mozilla Public License carefully limits the patent grant of the initial developer (Netscape)
to cover only patents that are necessary to the use of the Original Code.67 Thus, if
Netscape had at the time it contributed the Original Code a patent that was not infringed
by the Original Code, but was infringed by a new module added to that code at a later
time, nothing in the MPL would require Netscape to license that patent to subsequent
users of the code.68 A slightly different twist comes from IBM’s Common Public

63

GPL § 7 does include an odd provision barring redistribution by any party that is prevented by a patent
license from tolerating royalty-free distribution. Although that strongly suggests what is obviously
expected, it does not rise to the level of an express grant of IP rights by contributors.

64

As Rosen explains, there are numerous technical problems in relying on implied licenses, such as the
question whether the license extends to patents that have not yet been issued at the time of the contribution
or to later versions of the open-source project that do not exist at the time of the contribution. Rosen, supra
note 3, at 79, 126-127.

65

See e.g., Apache License §§ 2, 3; CDDL §§ 2.1, 2.2.

66

See Rosen, supra note 3, at 93-94.

67

It appears that the desire to delimit this grant so carefully was one of the main reasons for the
development of the MPL in preference to the then-existing reciprocal license forms. Rosen, supra note 3,
at 147-150.

68

Rosen, supra note 3, at 148-150.
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License, which excludes from the patent grant a license to any patent not issued at the
time of the contribution, even if an application already was on file.69
The final point of differentiation is how the licenses deal with the risk of
allegations of patent infringement. On this point, proprietary licenses often indemnify
users against patent infringement claims filed by third parties. That is not, however,
practical in the open source context. There, the “licensor” of any particular program
often is a distributed body of difficult-to-identify contributors.70 Thus, open source
licenses generally impose the infringement risk on licensees.71 The response to the
problem thus is limited to creating incentives of various degrees designed to deter users
of the program from instituting patent litigation by the threat of withdrawing further
rights to use the open source program.72 It is difficult to weigh the effect of those
provisions. For successful programs that become “mission-critical,” it is easy to see that
they would have a powerful effect. For less important programs that a user easily could
abandon, the provisions would be less effective.
For present purposes, what is most interesting is the great variation in the
provisions focusing on third party IP, primarily because it suggests more of a conscious
attention to the importance of protecting patent rights than one would expect given the
mythology of a patent-free open source movement. For example, § 8 of the MPL
provides that a suit claiming that a contributor’s version of the software violates a patent
will result in a termination of the plaintiff’s rights to use that version of the software.
Furthermore, a suit against any contributor to an MPL project for any other form of
patent infringement will lead to a termination of the right to use any contribution of that
participant to any MPL product.73 Perhaps the broadest provision appears in § 12.1(c) of
the Apple Public Source License, which terminates “if You * * * commence an action for
patent infringement against Apple; provided that Apple did not first commence an action
for patent infringement against You.”
Those provisions have a fascinating effect, because they generally operate not
only to protect the products in question, but as I discuss in more detail below, slowly to
bring open source products within the cross-licensing equilibrium that has provided
stability to the proprietary wing of the industry for some time. At the same time, those
provisions often seem unpalatable to companies with large patent portfolios, because they
require them to forgo claims under that portfolio for products unrelated to the open

69

CPL § 2; see Rosen, supra note 3, at 163-166.

70

That is particularly true for programs governed by licenses like the GPL that do not directly provide for
sublicensing, but rather contemplate licenses directly from each contributor to each user.

71

The closest thing to a warranty of noninfringement is the warranty of “provenance” that appears in many
of the modern open source licenses, in which the contributor states it “believes” that its contributions are its
original creations and noninfringing. MPL § 3.4(c); see Rosen, supra note 3, at 158, 198-201.

72

See e.g., Apache § 3; MPL § 8.2. As a related matter, licenses also often require contributors to include
notice of patent problems of which they might be aware. MPL § 3.4.

73

Rosen, supra note 3, at 154-56.

18

19

Open Source and Property Rights

February 16, 2006 Draft

source project in which they are participating. This has spurred the drafting of weaker
patent defense provisions, such as the one in the current version of § 10 of the Open
Software License and the Academic Free License, which terminates a license for the
contributed work only for a claim against the contributed work.74 By excluding
termination based on the exercise of patent rights against unrelated software, it is thought,
the provision makes participation in and use of open source projects more palatable for
firms with large patent portfolios.75

III. Motivations for the Commercialization of Open Source
A. Open Source as a Viable Business Model
As Section 2 suggests, open source development is aptly viewed as a direct
challenge to the traditional “one-shop” model of proprietary software development. The
natural question, then, how to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two
business models?
The important differences are easily summarized. In the proprietary model, the
coordination and direction of research and development are accomplished within the
boundaries of a single firm, directed and funded by the management of that firm. The
advantages of the model are that of bringing any complex activity within the boundaries
of a single firm: the ability of the firm to collect resources from investors and then decide
at a central point how best to allocate those resources to maximize the effectiveness of
any particular development project. The ability to make rapid responses to new and
surprising events, for example, is a strong advantage of the proprietary model.
In the open source model, by contrast, the level of central control is much lower,
with development proceeding through relatively decentralized hierarchies.76 The strength
of open source development is its potential to produce products with a higher quality and
more innovative character than parallel proprietary products. Although discourse from
supporters often reflects a deep-seated, at times almost mystical, conviction that
collaborative development is superior to centrally directed development, the argument in
fact resonates strongly with the recent literature on open innovation.77 In that context,
advocates have focused on the ability of a collaborative and decentralized development
process to produce better solutions more rapidly than a process centralized within a single
firm or laboratory. There is also a distinctly populist reveling in the idea that
unsupported individuals can produce software of a commercial quality that can compete
74

See also Apache License § 3 (similar provision).

75

Rosen, supra note 3, at 217-18.

76

This is not to say that there is not organization. As Weber, supra note 3, explains in detail, there is a
great deal of organization of open source development. My point, however, is that control and allocation of
resources is decentralized: Linus Torvalds has much less ability than Microsoft’s Chief Software Architect
to control precisely what Linux projects are handled with what level of urgency and resources.

77

HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND
PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (2003).
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with the output of the world’s largest corporations.78 It is, to be sure, difficult to obtain
empirical evidence about quality, and the existing evidence seems ambiguous.79 The
widespread adoption of the commercially successful open-source products, however,
offers strong testimony that in some contexts at least the collaborative development
model can produce software of high quality and easy interoperability.
Aside from the quality of the software product, there remains the key inquiry of
how it can make sense for profit-seeking firms to invest in open source projects if they
categorically will be prohibited from obtaining a return on their investment through
control of the resulting software. In the proprietary model, property rights make it
possible for a firm to internalize the benefits of R&D by excluding third parties from
exploiting the results of the research: it is not necessarily easy to make a profit, but it is
relatively easy to obtain revenues.
However, the direct importance of property rights to the proprietary software
industry can be overstated. Many firms do not directly exploit their patents, and
relatively few exploit their patents to collect licensing revenues.80 One industry
executive illustrated that point effectively when he explained that in large patentsophisticated firms in the software industry there is a split of about 15/85 between patents
that are licensed for revenues and those that are used defensively to maintain freedom of
action. The analogous ratio in the pharmaceutical industry, he suggested was about
75/25. To the extent that firms do collect licensing revenues,81 those revenues directly
support the R&D that helps the firm to maintain the quality and competitiveness of its
technology. Still, the ability to prevent third parties from copying software products (if
only through copyright protection) is much more robust in a model with property rights
than it is in an open source model, in which the standard OSI requirements – even in the
most lenient of licenses – make it impractical to exclude third parties from exploitation of
technology created in an open source community. Thus, the open source investor
searching for a return must do something other than sell software to customers that wish
to use it.
78

A. Boulanger, Open-Source Versus Proprietary Software: Is One More Reliable and Secure Than the
Other, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 239 (2005), provides an interesting (though inconclusive) study of vulnerability
and defect rates in open-source and proprietary software.
79

Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 265 (2004). On the one hand, open source proponents can point, among other things, to the low cost
of their products (often available for free). At the same time, advocates of proprietary software can point to
studies suggesting that the total cost of ownership, including training and maintenance charges, is higher
for open source software. As the text suggests, my impression is that the studies as a group are ambiguous,
suggesting that one type of software or the other might be cheaper and more effective in one context or
another, but that broad general claims of superiority are difficult to sustain.
80

Mann, supra note 1.

81

As discussed in Mann, supra note 1, IBM collects literally billions of dollars each year from the licensing
of software-related patents. Other incumbent firms, however, have been less successful in generating large
revenue streams from those patents. For example, although Microsoft has begun a similar program (also
discussed in Mann, supra note 1), it remains to be seen whether it will generate revenues that are
sufficiently large to play an important role on Microsoft’s income statement.
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1. Predatory Motive: the “Kill Microsoft” Approach
In the discussion of possible business models for open source investors, one of the
most prominent ideas (suggested, for example, by Rob Merges) is that the model itself
cannot be made profitable, but that firms invest in it solely because it decreases the
monopoly power of Microsoft.82 In its simplest form, the idea is that firms are willing to
make current expenditures that do not generate a monetary return under current
conditions, solely because of the likelihood that they will lessen the ability of Microsoft
to extract future monopoly profits in markets in which those firms might eventually
participate. To spin it slightly differently, a large customer (like Intel) might like to
preserve a competitor to Microsoft simply to minimize the risks of being locked in to a
single vendor.
Alternatively, perhaps the expectation is that profits will come from market power
in some new market that develops in a more open and competitive way than it would if
Microsoft were more powerful. For example, if IBM thinks that it can respond to change
and innovation more rapidly than competitors like Microsoft and Sun, then IBM should
expect to profit from any development that causes more rapid innovative shifts in the
industry.
This explanation is of great concern to Microsoft, where many executives plainly
believe that it has some element of truth. However, several software executives to whom
I have spoken have emphasized that the most obvious victims of IBM’s Linux strategy, to
the extent there have been victims, are UNIX competitors like Sun Microsystems, not
Microsoft. Sun at one time was a direct competitor with IBM in the market for servers
and the software that runs them. The rise of Linux has destabilized Sun’s market position
as a top-line purveyor of servers and of a state-of-the-art flavor of UNIX (Solaris).83
Thus, predatory-motive theory seems at best an incomplete story.
2. Traditional Profit Motive: the Value Chain Approach
Although there surely is some truth to it, the “kill Microsoft” explanation
understates the extent to which investments in open-source projects are directly profitable
– without regard to their effect on Microsoft. Before suggesting that the investments are
irrational, it is important to understand how substantial they really are. Executives have
estimated that the amount that proprietary companies currently spend on the development
of Linux is at least $1 billion a year, much of that coming from a small group of seven
large proprietary companies that are major investors in the Open Source Development
82

Merges, supra note 3.
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The competition between IBM and Sun is to some degree bound up in their differing open source
strategies. IBM of course was one of the earliest of the major proprietary companies to develop a strong
open source strategy. Sun’s interactions with the movement have been much less harmonious, both
because of its decision not to open source Java and because of its willingness to reach a cross-licensing
agreement with Microsoft that did not protect Open Office. It remains to be seen whether its decision to
open source Solaris in early 2004 will be successful. See also Raymond, supra note 26 (arguing that Sun’s
license structures have alienated open-source communities).
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Laboratory: IBM, HP, Intel, Fujitsu, Red Hat, Novell, and General Motors (collectively
the OSDL group).84
The most logical explanation for those investments comes from the typical
business-school concept of the value chain. The idea is that a successful IT installation
necessarily will involve a variety of components, which can be characterized collectively
as a value chain (or a software stack). Different companies will have core competencies
in different aspects of that chain. One classic strategy is for any company to foster the
commoditization of those portions of the stack in which the company does not have a
core competency, so that it can earn high(er) returns for those portions of the stack in
which it can defeat its competitors.
To use the simplest example, Microsoft and Intel can be seen as developing one
successful value chain that involves the sale of highly profitable products paired with the
successful commoditization of the personal computer that uses those products. The point
is currently easy to see, as the sale of IBM’s personal computer division to Lenovo marks
the departure of the firm that invented the market, and the increasing domination of a
firm the core competency of which is logistics (Dell).
The only departure from the well-recognized strategy described above is to use
non-proprietary – “free” – products as part of the value chain instead of commoditized
products from other proprietary companies. Conceptually, it is no different from a
developer dedicating public streets in a subdivision if that is the way to maximize the
total value of the package.85 Just as all homeowners in an area can benefit by sharing a
single public street that runs near all of their homes, the OSDL group benefits by sharing
the costs of production of the Linux operating system. For example, one group of
executives suggested that maintaining a competitive enterprise software platform
currently requires about $500 million of investment each year. If IBM can spend $100
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This surely understates the total amount of investment. As I have mentioned above, there is some
difficult-to-quantify amount of venture-backed investment. There also is a considerable amount of
informal investment from proprietary companies that tolerate code writing by their employees or sponsor
important open source participants as employees (as when Torvalds worked for some time at Transmeta).
MARTIN FINK, THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS OF LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE (2003). It also is common for
proprietary companies to spin off companies devoted wholly to open source. It is not yet clear, however,
how those activities relate to the venture investment activities of major firms. As Benson & Ziedonis show,
the investment models for those investments are quite difficult to understand. David Benson & Rosemarie
Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Corporate Venture Capital and the Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Firms
(unpublished 2004 Univ. of Mich. working paper). In this context, I expect that the most difficult to
quantify effect is the likelihood that a firm would support an open-source startup that itself might never be
profitable if the startup’s activities would increase demand for hardware, services, or infrastructure
products sold by the sponsor. This surely explains, for example, why Intel Capital is the most prolific
investor in the open source-related startups I discuss above. It invested in 14 of the 66 United States firms
in the “Computer Software” sector.
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See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857
(2003) (exploring why an innovator might gain more profit from an innovation if it could foster related
innovations through a gift to the public domain of some portion of the innovation).
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million per year on Linux and obtain access to such a platform, that is much cheaper than
maintaining the platform on its own.86
Thus, the individual members of the OSDL group can rationalize their
investments in Linux not solely because it might harm Microsoft, and not because of any
profits on sales of Linux, but because the development of Linux as a high-quality
operating system permits each of them to develop complementary goods and services in
their respective core competencies.87 From this perspective, Linux is not very different
from any other vendor providing a software product that can be loaded onto products
developed by the firm that contributes to Linux. For those firms, this value chain works
better for those companies than the competing Wintel value chain because it is a value
chain in which the operating system will not be used to extract profits. Indeed, open
source software is optimally suited for this type of arrangement because it is the ultimate
commodity: anybody can sell it for free, which makes it quite difficult for a firm to
develop a competitive position that allows it to extract profits that would undermine the
OSDL strategy. For now at least, this makes cooperation easier because the individual
firms more rationally can defer fears that the enterprise will tip in favor of one party’s
technology that will run the table and drive competitors from the market (as happens so
often in proprietary software products markets).
Moreover, when IBM and other members of the OSDL group began making large
investments in Linux, Linux already was beginning to make inroads in the server
market.88 If those companies had resolutely stayed outside that field, they risked a
disruption in the market – a shift from high-priced servers and proprietary operating
systems to commoditized servers with free operating systems that could have driven them
from it completely, something that seems about to happen to Sun despite its efforts to
participate in the open source community. The textbook response to that situation is to
attempt to co-opt the potentially disruptive technology into the business model of the
existing firm.89 The result has not been to stop the disruption. Rather, as suggested
above, it has been to focus the disruption on the firms least capable of integrating the new
technology into their business models (Sun, if this analysis turns out to be correct).90
Thus, investment in open source has for those companies (Intel and IBM being potential
beneficiaries of Sun’s difficulties) been successful as a disruptive strategy.
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See Raymond, supra note 26 (discussing the benefits of cost-spreading).
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Mahony & Naughton, supra note 4; Perens, supra note 43.
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For an official IBM account, see P.G. Capek et al., A History of IBM’s Open-Source Involvement and
Strategy, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 249 (2005).
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Clayton M. Christensen, Jr., The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to
Fail (1997). Industry executives emphasized that the rise of Linux does not fit the Christensen model
perfectly, largely because Linux entered the market from the top – as a high-quality flexible product,
moving from the most demanding users to the least demanding, rather than from the bottom, moving from
the least demanding users to the most demanding.
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The success of this strategy is particularly noteworthy given the general perception among my interview
subjects that Sun’s software technology – the Solaris operating system – is the most sophisticated of the
Unix-based operating systems.
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Therefore, to use an obvious example, IBM is perhaps the most multi-faceted firm
in the IT industry. If IBM cannot profit from sales of the Linux operating system and the
Apache web server program, there are plenty of ways that it can profit in a value chain
that uses those programs. For one thing, it can sell the servers that use those programs.
Although IBM has come far from the days when the sale of computer hardware was its
only business, it continues to have major hardware lines in the areas where Linux is most
commonly used. At the next level, IBM can write proprietary software that can be used
on those computers. For example, after IBM failed to write its own successful
proprietary web-server program, it surrendered to the dominant Apache program. Having
done so, it was able to develop its highly successful WebSphere program, which is
designed specifically to run on computers that use Apache. One of the key pieces of that
strategy was the ability of IBM to gain market adoption by marketing a program designed
for the large community of firms using Apache, something it was unable to do in earlier
years when it had tried to bundle similar products with its own proprietary server
programs. Finally, and perhaps most profitably, IBM is probably the industry leader at
selling the services that are necessary to make the various hardware and software
products fit together.91
Apple’s recent deployment of OS X is another exemplary application of the
value-chain approach. There, Apple has deployed a commoditized base of software
drawn from the OpenBSD flavor of UNIX, but placed on top of it the sophisticated look
and feel of a top-quality graphical user interface – focusing proprietary efforts on Apple’s
core competency.
B. Open Source as a Market Correction
The most thoughtful assessment of the role of IP in this context is Rob Merges’s
paper on A New Dynamism,92 which generally portrays open source as a market
correction responding to excessive protection of IP. He views the investments that
proprietary firms make in open source projects as “property preempting investments”
(PPI)—or a form of “anti-property”—designed to protect the commons from enclosure
by IP rights held by incumbents (of whom Microsoft is his principal concern). Although
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My analysis is not undermined by the examples in Peter Swire’s cogent working paper on the security
market, Security Market: Incentives to Disclose for Security and Competitive Reasons (Oct. 11, 2005)
(draft §§ II(B)(3) – (4), discussing this manuscript). Swire suggests that his interviews indicate that
proprietary firms are profiting directly from investments in open-source related areas and that my “valuechain” analysis suggests an undue level of indirectness and complication is necessary for proprietary firms
to profit in this area. Studying his examples, however, I have the impression that the disagreement is
largely semantic. His principal examples – firms that use proprietary code adjoined to open-source code or
firms that sell services tailored to open-source code – strike me as precisely the type of business models
that I discuss here.
92

Merges, supra note 3.
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that perspective brings a healthy dose of economic analysis to a subject that is often
unduly romanticized,93 I believe that his perspective also is incomplete.
Merges argues that the balance between too many and too few property rights can
or will be solved essentially by making PPIs or creation of “anti-property” rights.94
Generally, he suggests that the investments are designed to make (in my words) an
“exclosure” – the opposite of an enclosure – as a “property-free zone”95 into which later
actors cannot force their proprietary claims. That is not, however, a complete answer.
To be sure, developers do write lines of code and contribute them to a community under
licenses that grant broad use rights to subsequent licensee users. For several reasons,
however, that does not have nearly so bucolic an effect as the casual reader of Merges’
paper might assume.
The first reason is the simplest one: contributors to open source projects for the
most part96 do not convey their IP rights wholesale to the open source community – they
only license them. Therefore, in the case of Linux, there are literally hundreds of
contributors that own copyright interests in their contributed code and thereby retain the
ability to hinder reversioning of the GPL through exercise of their retained copyright
interests.97 The possibility of conflict is not simply a matter of “FUD”98: the analogous
reversioning problem for the MPL is at least partially responsible for the birth of Firefox
as a substantially new program free from the strictures of the original MPL.
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See Anupam Chandler & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331
(2004), for a similarly anti-romantic account.
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Merges, supra note 3.
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I do not want to press the point too far, but the rhetoric of a commons also is inconsistent with the
reliance on trademarks, which are critically important to the open source model. See Rosen, supra note 3,
at 231-32; see also Ingrid Marson, Torvalds Weighs in on Linux Trademark Row, CNet, Aug. 22, 2005
(discussing Linus Torvalds’s defense of vigorous action taken on his behalf to enforce the Linux
tradename); Ingrid Marson, JBoss Denies Running a Trademark Monopoly, CNet, Oct. 11, 2005
(discussing responses by Marc Fleury to critics of JBoss’s trademark enforcement policies). Trademarks
have some of the same attributes as other forms of intangible property, such as the creation of network or
bandwagon effects. Therefore, even if open source did not depend on patent or copyright protections – a
point that I debate in the text – it is still hard to say that property rights are not important in open source.
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Although that problem does apply to large portions of the Linux code (apparently because of the
expressed wishes of Linus Torvalds), it is by no means universal. Many contributors in fact do convey
their rights to entities like the Free Software Foundation or the Apache Foundation, which for my purposes
would seem to be a trustee of the “exclosed” commons.
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For discussion of the reversioning effort, go to www.gplv3.fsf.org (login required).
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According to wikipedia, FUD “is a sales or marketing strategy of disseminating negative but vague or
inaccurate information on a competitor's product. The term originated to describe misinformation tactics in
the computer software industry and has since been used more broadly. * * * * FUD was first defined by
Gene Amdahl after he left IBM to found his own company, Amdahl Corp.: ‘FUD is the fear, uncertainty,
and doubt that IBM sales people instill in the minds of potential customers who might be considering
Amdahl products.’” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FUD
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In the event of disagreement over the direction a project should take, ultimately
the dispute will be resolved in favor of the person that controls the relevant IP (whether
that is copyrights in the source code, control of the trade name, or ownership of important
patents).99 Similarly, reversioning of the GPL would be much easier if everyone in the
community could be sure that all of the hundreds of Linux contributors blithely would
agree to anything that the organizers of the Free Software Foundation and OSDL submit
as an appropriate update of the GPL.100 But in the end, if there is a dispute over either of
those issues, the person with control of the IP will have the final word: it is Torvalds’
control of much of the core IP in Linux that gives him so much negotiating power in the
struggle to update the GPL.
For still another variation, consider the case of dual-licensing firms like MySQL,
where substantially all of the IP rights are localized in the hands of a firm that directly
employs contributors to the project, which allows the firm to use a conventional
proprietary licensing model to exploit a version of the software that might not differ
substantially from the version available under an open-source license.
The second reason why an “exclosure” may not create a fully property-free zone
relates to the terms of the open source projects’ licenses. As discussed above, it is quite
plain, particularly in the area of the modern commercial licenses (the MPL, the CPL, the
Apple and Sun licenses, etc.),101 that licenses are consciously being drafted with
considerable technical care to limit the nature of the patent rights a contributor licenses to
an open source community. As discussed above, the modern licenses generally do not
offer a broad grant of all IP rights necessary to permit development of the project to
which the contribution has been made. Rather, they are limited to existing patents, or to
patents that apply to the project in its current stage, or the like.
The third reason is a simple matter of patent doctrine. Even in situations in which
contributors have used licenses or contribution agreements that operate to transfer all of
their IP interests, they cannot logically create a property-free “exclosure,” because of the
possibility that the resulting software product will infringe patent rights held by
noncontributors. To be sure, open-source contributions might amount to a sufficiently
public use of the code to constitute prior art, and thus would prevent others from
obtaining subsequent patent rights that prevented use of the code by the open source
community. They would not, however, prevent the assertion of patent rights by persons
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See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Mambo Project Faces Rift, CNet, Aug. 22, 2005 (discussing
dispute among contributors to Mambo).
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As I revise this manuscript, the possibility of conflict has become more serious, as Linus Torvalds has
announced his dissatisfaction with the early drafts of GPLv3.0. See Richard Stallman’s Radical Approach
to Software Patents, SCI-TECH TODAY, Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.sci-techtoday.com/news/Stallman-s-Radical-Approach-to-Software/story.xhtml?story_id=0200028E0GNC.
101

Because the GPL includes no explicit patent license from its contributors, it is harder to be precise in
making this point about the GPL. I take it as plain, however, that the implied license conveyed by a GPL
contribution would be similarly incomplete. See Rosen, supra note 3.
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who had made similar undisclosed inventions before the creation of the open source prior
art.
Perhaps the most effective way – albeit an imperfect and costly one – to ensure a
zone free of third-party property rights is for the software developer to create its own
patent rights to cover the space. For example, Sun claims102 that it owns all of the patents
necessary for the deployment of Solaris. Early and aggressive patenting can make it
difficult for independent designers to obtain patent rights that write on to the covered
product, though even there the possibility of surprise bombshell patents is a real one in an
industry with such a high pace of innovation, where foundational patents easily could
issue in 2005 for primeval technology first invented in the distant past of 2001. Thus,
many if not all of the large firms in this area continue to collect patents. Although several
of those firms have made statements about their plans to enforce or not enforce certain
patents against certain potential infringers, none of those firms has made an enforceable
commitment to forego their enforcement rights entirely. To the contrary, those patent
rights are maintained as part of the elaborate equilibrium of cross-licensing arrangements
that I describe above.
To be sure, the early days of 2005 witnessed some notable pledges not to enforce
patents by IBM,103 Sun, and Nokia. Those statements, however, did not extend to
contributing the patents to a commons, much less to a property-free public domain.
Thus, for example, IBM’s pledge was made to developers of open source products and
not the public at large.104 The underlying technology is not, for example, available for
the development of proprietary offerings by competing products or services firms (such
as Microsoft or Apple, both of which have used UNIX technology in their operating
systems). Nor is the grant absolute, because it is not effective against a firm that asserts
patent claims against IBM. Similarly, Sun’s pledge is limited to patents used in
Solaris,105 so it does little more than the implied (or express) grant of patent rights that
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This claim seems most implausible, although it has been made quite publicly.

103

In the case of IBM, the contribution followed a statement that IBM does not intend to assert its patent
portfolio against the Linux kernel, unless it is forced to defend itself. That statement is broader, in the
sense that it covered the entire portfolio, but it is much less formal, and thus much less likely to create
reliably enforceable obligations on the part of IBM as circumstances change in the ever-developing
landscape of the industry.

104

IBM’s pledge applies “to any individual, community, or company working on or using software that
meets the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition of open source software now or in the future.” The
patents (a list of which is available on IBM’s web site) cover a broad range of technologies. However,
some have criticized the scope of the pledge because many of the patents are thought to be of little use to
the open source community. A cursory review of the list reveals that 397 of the 500 patents are in primary
IPC G06F (the code typically associated with software). Some of the patents are quite dated: 199 were
issued in 2001; 232 were issued in 1997; and 69 were issued in 1993.
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Sun’s pledge purports to give free access to patents “under the Common Development and Distribution
License (CDDL).”
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would be included in a license to use Solaris.106 To be sure, responding to a barrage of
criticism of the limited significance of that pledge, Sun has announced that despite the
absence of a “fancy pledge” on its website, it has “no intention of suing open source
developers.”107 Still, it is not at all clear that Sun has committed that it will not use its
patent portfolio to challenge Linux as a competitor to Solaris. To the extent Sun’s
program rests on the desire to create a Solaris-based value chain that would facilitate the
sale of hardware, an attack to destabilize the Linux-based value chain might be a
plausible response. The narrowness of the pledges is made clearest by the praise Nokia
garnered for the modest step of extending its pledge not only to the existing versions of
Linux but also to future ones.108
I do not mean to understate the commitment of those firms to the development of
collaborative research in those areas. My point is a more fundamental one: that it is not
constructive to think of these investments as creating a truly open domain, or in Merges’s
terms, a “property preempting investment.”
Having said that, there can be little doubt that open source strategies are deterring
others from enforcing their patent rights in some contexts. It works just like the creation
of large patent portfolios within individual firms, but is potentially even more powerful.
Essentially, using combined patent portfolios to create fences around (at least) some open
source technologies, the large firms are just shifting the equilibrium slightly. In
substance, they are sending a clear message:
We mean to protect these technologies as much as – if not
more than – we protect our own proprietary products. Although we
may not use our patent rights offensively, we will use them to
defend our proprietary products and the open source technologies
that we support.109
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See CDDL § 2.1(b). As discussed above, express or implied provisions to that effect are ubiquitous in
modern open-source licenses.
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Stephen Shankland, Sun: Patent Use OK Beyond Solaris Project, Jan. 31, 2005, available at
http://news.com.com/Sun+Patent+use+OK+beyond+Solaris+project/2100-7344_35557658.html?tag=sas.email
108

Jim Wagner, Nokia’s Linux Pledge, Developer, May 26, 2005, available at
http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3508146. For an additional anecdote about Computer
Associates, compare the laudatory press release discussing Computer Associates’ pledge, Chris
Preimesberger, CA Patents Made Available to Open-Source Community, eWeek.com, Sept. 7, 2005, with
later criticism of the pledge as ineffectual, Matt Whipp, Computer Associates’ Patent Donation Is
Slammed, PC Pro, Sept. 13, 2005 (reporting complaints about the CA pledge on the grounds that the
covered patents had little value).
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As I complete this article, several of the major Linux backers have formalized this strategy with the
formation of the Open Invention Network. Press reports suggest this entity will provide royalty-free
licenses to parties that agree not to assert patent rights against Linux users that have signed similar
agreements. Linux Backers Form Patent-Sharing Firm, CNet, Nov. 10, 2005. If the licenses gain broad
acceptance, then it could create a shared equilibrium for the patents held by those entities.
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IV. The Effect of Commercialized Open Source
A. Effect on Industry Organization and Innovation
If the ultimate effect of the “property-preempting investments” described above
really is a shift in the enforcement equilibrium to bring open source programs under the
shelter of some of the existing large-firm portfolios, then it is hard to accept the open
source phenomenon as a fundamental weakening of the IP system. That is not to say,
however, that the rise of open source will not affect innovation in the industry. Recent
literature on the relation between IP and industrial organization provides a strong
theoretical basis110 for expecting that the prevailing open source business models will
have consequences for the location of innovation.111 As Tim Wu explains, there is good
reason to think that this kind of effect – an effect on the “decision architecture” of an
industry – often will be a more important effect of intellectual property rights than a
direct effect on competition caused by exploitation of the right to exclude.112
I start with the theory articulated by Ashish Arora and his coauthors that a
stronger IP system often leads to smaller and more specialized firms.113 Generally, they
reason, strong IP rights encourage investment in specialized firms with a superior ability
to innovate, largely because strong IP rights limit the costs of leakage that occurs when
the locus of innovation is beyond a firm’s boundaries.114 Conversely, they argue, a
weaker IP system makes it more difficult to protect proprietary technology and thus
prompts the creation of larger firms and industry consolidation.115 The effect is
particularly salient with technologically intensive inputs, and leads to investments in
smaller specialized firms over vertically integrated firms. Research in the chemical
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In addition to the I/O literature that I discuss below, Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence
Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1215 (2005), reports
empirical evidence that stronger IP systems influence the direction of innovation. Although there
obviously are numerous potentially overdetermining factors, the recent history of the software industry
arguably bears out this point, where we have seen a great deal of innovation at the same time that software
patents became easier to obtain.
111

It is difficult to quantify the effect of stronger or weaker intellectual property systems on levels of
innovation. As I explain in Mann, supra note 1, we can say that the levels of innovation in the software
industry seem quite high, with R&D intensities greater than in most other industries during the last decade.
My point here is simply that the rise of open source is likely to affect the location and dispersion of that
innovation.
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Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2006).
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Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for
Technology Licensing (unpublished Dec. 16, 2004 manuscript); Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges,
Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and R&D Input (unpublished 2001 manuscript); Ashish Arora & Robert
P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
451 (2004).
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industry (by Arora) and semiconductor industry (by Hall and Ziedonis) provides
empirical support for that possibility.116
The theory that Arora and his co-authors have articulated has obvious applications
to the software industry. This is the best example of an industry in which innovation is
cumulative, i.e., one in which many firms are attempting to build new products that use
the same set of cutting-edge ideas. Thus, a fragmented structure can provide multiple
opportunities for solutions to difficult technological problems. This is surely part of the
explanation for evidence suggesting that small firms can be more innovative than large
firms.
It is also plainly the case that use of property rights to codify the output from
research and development makes it much easier for firms of differing sizes and research
emphases to settle into a cross-licensing equilibrium. Without some form of protection, it
would be difficult to force participants in the industry to come to terms regarding how
much they should contribute to agreements with their various cross-licensing partners, or
to exclude from the equilibrium firms that do not contribute their share of innovation.
Applied to the software industry, it is apparent that as property rights were
strengthened in the mid-1990’s, the industry became increasingly fragmented. This
suggests at least a possibility that the fragmentation has supported a higher rate of
innovation than otherwise would have existed. The natural question, then, is whether
open source will alter the characteristics that have led to the existing structure. There are
good reasons to think – as paradoxical as it might seem – that the rise of open source will
support industry consolidation, not fragmentation.117 At bottom, this is because the
business models that are most likely to succeed in connection with open source
development are business models that work better for larger firms.
The first point relates to credibility. A fundamental distinction between open
source and proprietary software is the ambiguity of the sponsor of the program. For
proprietary software products, a specific company typically owns, develops, maintains,
and supports the program. The purchase of a proprietary software product is, for the
most part, a bet that a specific and plainly identifiable company will stand behind the
116

Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry (unpublished April
1996 manuscript); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101
(2001); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me in: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent
Acquisition Strategies of Firms (January 2004 draft).
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Although it cannot be measured, it may also have implications for the level of innovation. My sense is
that corporate participation in the movement—whether or not it succeeds—reflects the fact that the industry
has matured to the point that the level of innovation has caught up or is catching up to the needs of users.
If innovation is viewed as the commercialization of basic research (perhaps, here, the Internet), then there
would be a period of rapid fragmentation and innovation – until the number of possible ways to
commercialize the technologies begins to stabilize – followed by a reconsolidation of firms, a lessening of
the pace of innovation, and a focus on the efficient delivery of well-defined products and services. At that
point, we might expect major breakthroughs to come from academia, government and R&D divisions of
large firms until some new “transformative need” is identified or satisfied.
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product in a number of important ways. Three of the most important are that the
developer will repair flaws in the product promptly; that it will upgrade the product to
account for new technological developments; and (most importantly for my analysis) that
it will protect users from claims that use of the product infringes the IP rights of third
parties.118
It may be that proprietary software developers do not often incur ironclad
contractual obligations on all of those points. Yet whatever their contracts might say,
they certainly have considerable residual legal responsibility for those problems.
Moreover, in the reputational marketplace in which software vendors compete for
customers, there is a powerful motivation for a software developer to accept
responsibility for serious problems related to its software, without regard to the details of
its anticipated legal responsibility for those problems.
In contrast, the situation is considerably more complex for open source software.
For one thing, the licenses that govern open source software differ from the licenses that
govern proprietary software in that the authors of the software are likely to categorically
disclaim responsibility for the kinds of problems discussed above.119 That makes some
sense given the nature of the software’s development, where specific contributions are
made by individuals that cannot expect to use profits from the sale of the software to
defray anticipated liabilities that might arise from its distribution and use. Moreover,
interviews with industry executives suggest that even the proprietary companies that
operate in the open source community almost uniformly disclaim any legal responsibility
for problems with the software.
What that means is that any response to users’ problems with open source
software is likely to come from a reputational constraint rather than some enforceable
legal obligation. It is, of course, much more difficult for a business to assess the
reliability of a reputational constraint than a legal obligation. Yet it cannot be rational for
a business to adopt an open source software platform without satisfying itself that
somebody will maintain, upgrade, and defend the software.120
The most obvious generality must be that a reputational constraint will be more
robust for a large and publicly visible firm than it is for a small and emerging one.
Detractors of open source software often argue that it is risky for a business to rely on
those kinds of constraints for important software purchases. I have no occasion to assess
the plausibility of that argument – my point here is simply that a rational business would
find it much easier to overcome that concern when the open source software is closely
associated with a large and publicly visible firm than when the software is associated
118
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with a smaller or younger firm. It is no accident that open source’s commercial success
has risen rapidly since IBM’s public embrace of Apache and Linux at the beginning of
this decade. So, for example, assuming products of similar quality, it seems plain that
even a relatively small publicly traded firm like Pervasive would have an advantage in
finding customers for an open-source database product over smaller startup firms
purveying similar products (like Green Plum).
The second point relates to the distinction between products and services firms.
As discussed above, the open source model leans ineluctably toward services firms,
particularly when the underlying open source project is governed by the GPL. Thus, the
open source model tends to lead to a population of services firms customizing and
integrating software and hardware for enterprise customers, while the proprietary model
more often leads to a set of products firms selling off-the-shelf products that may trade
off specialized functionality for ease of installation and maintenance. This is of course a
generalization – there are open-source products firms (like MontaVista and the startups
discussed above) and important proprietary services firms. But the constraints of the
business model do press open source firms toward the services end of the spectrum more
forcefully than they do proprietary firms.
To the extent that this theory is true, the open source model should in turn support
larger firms because larger firms have a comparative advantage in the service sectors of
the software industry. A few overlapping reasons give rise to this comparative
advantage. First, the VC startup model works much better for products firms than it does
for services firms;121 thus, there will be relatively few startup services firms.122 Second,
there is good reason to think that the property rights granted by patents will be uniquely
valuable to firms attempting to progress successfully through the venture-backed stage.123
The comparative advantage continues throughout the business cycle. Just as the
products model is better suited to the venture-backed financing common for startups,
large established firms will have an advantage in service sectors.124 For one thing, large
incumbent firms are simply going to be better at the integrative services model
epitomized by IBM. The “not flashy, just fully informed” business is nearly always
going to be the large established firm, not the destructive innovator. For another, as I
heard repeatedly in interviews, there are considerable economies of scale in providing the
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kind of 24/7 quick-response service that large corporations expect from their software
providers: it is much harder for a startup with three customers to support that kind of
infrastructure than a larger company with dozens (or hundreds) of customers to support.
Red Hat is perhaps the best example of this. After raising $13 million from
venture capitalists and strategic investors in 1998 and early 1999, Red Hat raised $84
million in an August 1999 IPO. However, even Red Hat was unable to achieve
profitability using a traditional services model coupled with a pure open-source product.
Red Hat never turned a profit until its decision in 2002 to split its product line between
the slow-changing Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), which comes with certifications,
long-term guarantees for support and bug fixes, and a mandatory per-computer price tag;
and the fast-changing Fedora, which is free, uncertified, relatively unsupported, and
packed with the latest upgrades. Selling annual subscriptions to RHEL helped push Red
Hat into profitability for the first time in 2004.125
More generally, we could say that a property rights system favors new entrants
because large firms can use other tools related to their market power to continue to grow
(leveraging products against other products, leveraging services against products,
marketing advantages, etc.). Small firms have nowhere to turn except property
rights. More pointedly, it is much easier for a small startup to pursue an idea to the point
of having a solid patent or set of patents sufficient to protect the idea from competitors
than it is to develop the kind of brand identification and market power that would make it
a strong competitor against the large incumbent firms in the industry. In substance (as
Figure One suggests), this is a basic distinction in the types of appropriation mechanisms
that are useful for different types of firms.
FIGURE ONE: APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS
SMALLER FIRMS

LARGER FIRMS

First-Mover Advantage
Patents

Market Power
Brand Identification
Leveraging Value Chains

From this perspective, what open source does, in the sectors where it succeeds, is
to remove from the market firms that are developing discrete products from which they
wish to get revenues.126 So we see that a fuller vision of open source reveals a great
interconnection, if not outright dependence, on proprietary property rights, and the
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potential that it might support a substantial shift in the dispersion of innovation in the
industry. Thus, it is open source, and not patents, that pose the biggest threat to the
“polyarchic” decision structure under which the software industry has flourished for the
last decade.127
Taking the point further, it is possible that open source might disrupt not only the
ability of small firms to grow and innovate, it also might disrupt the relatively stable
equilibrium under which the industry has grown in the last several years.128 The legal
dispute over Linux plainly has the potential to disrupt the distribution of Linux-related
products and services.129 Open source still has many unanswered questions: What
happens if one of the many individual contributors to an open source program provides
even a few lines of code that contain the trade secrets of another firm? Or that infringe
another firm’s copyright or patent? Would removal of the infringing lines be an adequate
response? Or would a court enjoin distribution of the entire program? Or require the
payment of substantial damages by any and all of the many users of the program?
Thus, we see the industry at a turning point. The rapid growth of property rights
in the industry over the last decade has had a relatively benign effect so far, largely
because of the relatively stable equilibrium that has prevailed until now.130 But can the
open source business models discussed above grow to maturity without collapsing that
equilibrium? Will one method of development or the other prevail so completely as to
dominate the industry?
Some of those questions are directly at issue in the SCO litigation. Others are
implicit. For example, the case directly raises the possibility that a court might hold the
GPL unenforceable.131 Does it create a binding contract?132 Will it be enforced as
written? Will anyone who distributes open source software be forever barred from
enforcing property rights? And, will large patentees such as IBM use their patents as a
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club to protect just Linux or will those protections extend to other open source programs?
The way the industry is responding to those unsettled questions is fascinating; the
answers will likely reveal the direction of the industry in the years to come.
Another important question is the significance of the various development
communities arising in the open source space. If large firms take over much of the open
source software, what will happen to those communities? Richard Epstein, for example,
pointedly questions whether loose networks of affiliated firms can survive without the
corporate governance structures that support the single-firm models.133 His question,
applied to open source communities, raises two related points.
The first point relates to the licenses. In the current environment, at least, there is
some reason to be concerned about the stability of the existing licenses, and in particular,
the stability of communities built on reciprocal licenses like the GPL. As discussed
above, reciprocal licenses like the GPL134 impose greater restrictions on the ability of
proprietary firms to integrate their products with open source code than academic licenses
or many of the more recently developed commercial licenses. For the outsider, it is
difficult to assess the significance of that point. Thus, it is clear from the interviews I
conducted that sophisticated developers can use techniques to write programs that are
adequately functional and yet technically maintain the separation from the operating
system’s kernel that is necessary to avoid “infection” by the GPL license. What is not
clear, however, is how much effort is required for engineers of less than complete
sophistication to invent or master those techniques. The interviews leave me with the
strong impression that this is a serious problem for all but the most elite organizations.
This suggests a minor point of some irony – that increasing (or decreasing) use of the
GPL interacts with a relative advantage that larger companies have in working on the
fringes of GPL projects.
The second point is that the type of license will likely have some effect on the
type of software firm that effectively can use the project. For example, it is widely
recognized that a more lenient license permits more third-party development.135 Previous
scholars have not focused, however, on the likely effects that differing licenses have on
the types of third-party development. A strong reciprocal license (like the GPL) works
fine for a services firm. A firm that profits from services should be relatively agnostic
about the commoditization of the software that their customers buy.136 Indeed, they
should prefer Linux to the extent that Linux is more of a hybrid product than competing
133
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proprietary products – thereby shifting a greater share of the cost of ownership to services
related to installation and integration. Thus, for example, firms like Cygnus Solutions,
Linuxcare, Turbolinux, and Red Hat have developed business models for selling
consulting and services related to Linux software. VA Linux, like IBM, sells both
consulting services and servers.
In contrast to services firms, it is much easier for a products firm to operate in an
environment with a less restrictive license (like Apache or a BSD-space). Thus, small
firms like Covalent and Gluecode develop proprietary software that is designed to operate
with Apache software. More importantly, some of the most highly visible and successful
proprietary software products have been built on top of code covered by such licenses.
The most prominent example of course is IBM’s WebSphere program, discussed above,
which is built on and interacts directly with the Apache Web server. More recently,
Apple’s widely acclaimed new operating system – OS X – rests on top of a BSD-licensed
operating system (FreeBSD 3.2): Apple has layered its popular graphic user interface
(GUI) onto the UNIX style open source operating system. Executives with whom I
discussed that subject pointed to this as one of the most perceptive executions of a core
competency strategy: Apple maintains control of the GUI that gives its products so much
verve in the marketplace, but takes advantage of the commoditized operating system
available from the open source community.
As the commercialization of the open source model proceeds, the pressure placed
on the GPL will necessarily increase. If it turns out that it is important in the marketplace
for there to be proprietary products more closely related to the Linux kernel than the GPL
permits, the open source movement will confront a contracting crisis in which the
software must suffer in functionality unless the GPL can be revised to accommodate
those concerns. As Epstein notes, that is the scenario that poses the greatest challenge to
the decentralized development model: the lack of a single control point makes a
substantial shift in direction more difficult than it is for a proprietary firm.137 The Linux
community is aware of the problem, as it enters a period of “reversioning” designed to
promulgate a new version of the GPL that would cover subsequent distributions of
Linux.138 The inability of Mozilla to pass through reversioning successfully makes this
process an important one for the open source communities: can they develop the
institutional structures to modify the contracts successfully (as they hope) or will they be
forced periodically to start over (as Firefox has done for the most part in the browser
market)? Long-term commercial success probably depends on the ability of the
proponents of Linux to persuade users that they will not need to start over simply to
resolve licensing problems.
Beyond those short term problems lurk longer-term problems. Academics
commonly have noted the apparent incongruity in the large-scale voluntary efforts of
open source contributors to develop commercially valuable software.139 A sophisticated
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literature offers a variety of reasons why individuals might make such contributions.140
As commercialization proceeds, however, and firms justify their contributions by
reference to the kinds of value-chain motivations discussed above, there is a risk that
long-term shifts in market structure will cause those motivations to dissipate. For
example, it makes sense in current conditions for all of the various players in the OSDL
group to make substantial contributions of personnel, technology, and resources to Linux
development. However, as the market shifts and different firms gain dominance, there
always is the possibility that the community capable of profiting from Linux-related
products may contract (just as it might grow). Thus, Dell recently withdrew from OSDL,
apparently (according to comments in my interviews) concluding that the markets in
which it could exploit its core capabilities were not sufficiently related to Linux products
to justify continued contributions.
This is, at its core, a classic free-rider problem: if some of the contributors are
profiting from value-chain investments in Linux and others are not, why shouldn’t those
who are not profiting (or are profiting less) withdraw from the process (or diminish their
contributions). Once that process begins, it might rapidly reach a tipping point where
commercial contributions became limited to a relatively small number of firms.
Broader concerns relate to the continuing efforts of firms to use the contracts that
organize their communities to design novel and specialized types of communities – just
as the real-estate developer uses covenants and restrictions to erect a particular set of
property rights tailor-made to a particular subdivision. Existing practices suggest a
spectrum ranging from complete enclosure in a single firm to open access to all.141
The first step along this spectrum is the proprietary development system,
exemplified by Apple’s desktop computers, which traditionally have used an operating
system with a completely proprietary interface that allows Apple to control not only the
basic products, but also the applications and utilities that interact with those products.
The vigor of that model is consistent with the 2004 dispute between Apple and Real
Networks over Real’s efforts to develop software compatible with Apple’s highly
successful iPod. That development model has allowed Apple to develop products that
many users regard as the ultimate in functionality and ease of integration, though it of
course has had drawbacks in limiting the size of the development community that
produces applications for those products.142
The second step is proprietary development with an open interface. Microsoft’s
products typically have joined closely guarded proprietary code with relatively easy
access to interfaces, allowing third parties to develop compatible products. That model
has given Microsoft strong market power in the market for operating systems and office
applications for desktop computers, both because of Microsoft’s enormous investments in
140
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continuing development of its software and because of the substantial community of
third-party developers whose products have extended the functionality of Microsoft’s
software.
A third step is a gated community. A good example from my interviews appears
in the context of semiconductor development. In that industry, there are two substantial
competing camps of research and development. Intel of course leads one of them. The
other is a consortium of researchers from IBM, Advanced Micro Devices, and others. All
members of the consortium contribute funds and personnel, and gain access to a pooled
set of IP, but the IP is not available to nonmembers (which is to say, Intel). Industry
executives praised the success of this development model, which has produced
technology commensurate with Intel’s technology at a much lower cost. Although this
type of community is formally proprietary, the practical import is quite similar to the
modern commercial open source community. As discussed above, the patent licenses
typically offered by open source contributors are so carefully restricted as to limit the
freedom of outsiders to use the technology or take it in directions contrary to the wishes
of the sponsors and major contributors.
The final step on the spectrum is the wholly open community, characterized (at
least in theory)143 by the Linux community governed by the GPL. The business case for
this community is openly one of collaborative development. As suggested above, that
model offers benefits both from the cost savings of collaborative development and from
the technological gains of collaborative rather than one-shop development.144
It is clear that major market players are constantly developing new consortia, on a
case-by-case basis, which reflect different structures for investment in and access to
technology, tailored to different user markets. At the most simplistic level, development
at the proprietary end of the spectrum is more suited for products aimed at individuals,
such as desktop applications, where ease of installation and network effects are integral to
market penetration. At the opposite end, wholly open solutions often are attractive for
applications targeted at sophisticated users in enterprise settings where factors like total
cost of ownership and specialized integration with other systems are more important than
ease of installation. As those structures become increasingly specialized and numerous,
will their informality be able to survive? As the discussion above suggests, any number
of events could destabilize those communities – a tipping toward the technology of a
particular partner, or an incendiary assertion of property rights by somebody outside the
community.
B. Effect on Intellectual Property Rights
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The most pointed question is the importance of property rights in the years to
come. There are some contractual efforts to limit the importance of those claims. For
example, firms like Microsoft and HP have begun to indemnify their users from potential
infringement claims.145 Others have begun to offer insurance policies.146 Similarly, one
of the distinguishing features of the subscription models that are developing for opensource products is contractual provisions that protect customers from IP claims related to
the open-source product.147 As discussed above, still others are promising not to enforce
existing property rights, or (at least implicitly) promising to enforce existing property
rights to harm those who threaten the movement.
Still, most agree that it is necessary to acquire more patents to play the game.
Hence, it is relevant that the major corporate members of the OSDL group continue to
make heavy investments in patented technology: IBM and HP, for example have both
recently been obtaining new software patents at a pace of more than 1000 patents/year.
Similarly, press reports suggest that pure open source firms increasingly are attempting to
acquire their own patents, primarily to protect themselves against the threat of
litigation.148 There may have been a time when the open source community was
dominated by a political motivation not to obtain software patents, but that time is fading
rapidly into the past. In addition, it is worth noting that most software patents are issued
to firms outside the industry.149 There is no reason to think that an increase – or decrease
– in collaborative development in the software industry will have a substantial effect on
the propensity of firms outside the industry to obtain patents.
Finally, and most fundamentally, it is not clear that the models of the corporate
participants (like the OSDL group) would work without the internalization of R&D rights
that patents facilitate. If much of the participation of proprietary firms in open source
development is motivated by “value-chain” returns – i.e., firms accepting (or fostering)
commoditization at one point of a value chain at the same time they attempt to stake out a
profitable point of competency elsewhere on the set of products and services their
145
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customers use – then patents presumably will be just as important (if not more so) in the
remaining core areas in which those firms are attempting to differentiate themselves.
Thus, IBM’s willingness to refrain from enforcing some of its patents against open source
developers does not carry with it a willingness to forgo the use of IP to protect its
proprietary products like WebSphere. It may be that patents are less useful for the
services portion of IBM’s business than they are for its products or hardware sectors, but
there is little reason to believe that any of those lines of activity would benefit from the
removal of patent protection. Nor has Sun granted free access to its portfolio – it has
granted only the patent rights necessary for the use of the specific program that it has
contributed to the open source community.
The core issue, I think, is the question of the significance of the threat of patent
infringement litigation. The mere threat has had numerous effects, ranging from the
contractual assurances discussed above, to some difficult-to-gauge disruption of Linux
adoption. There also have been a number of events suggesting the possibility that large
firms not participating in open source value chains might exploit their portfolio against
those that are participating in those value chains.150 It is not clear, however, that the
enforcement risk in fact is substantial. First and most important, to date the risk remains
only hypothetical: there has not yet been a patent infringement suit filed challenging the
use or development of Linux or any other open source program of which I am aware.
Second, the risk of litigation is easily overstated. The basic concern is as follows:
(I) that there are literally thousands of existing software patents that cover the subjects of
open source software programs – perhaps 10,000 patents that cover operating systems
alone; (II) that open source communities as a matter of disdain for the practices of
proprietary firms do not sully themselves with obtaining patents; (III) that infringement
by open source products is more detectable than infringement by proprietary products,
because the source code will more directly display the algorithm of the software; and thus
(IV) that users of open source software are at a substantial risk of liability for patent
infringement.151 A prominent study by Open Source Risk Management (OSRM), for
example, concluded that the Linux kernel infringes 283 currently issued patents.152 The
OSRM business model, however, is predicated on the seriousness of that risk, which
makes it difficult to weigh the credibility of its study.
Two points make me doubt the significance of the patent infringement threat. The
first and most important is the limited usefulness of patents as a tool for appropriating
innovations in software. As I explain in detail in a related paper, most patents on
software innovations are not sufficiently robust to prevent competitors from developing
non-infringing programs that include the functionality of the innovation represented by
150
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the patent.153 This is true for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the
pattern of software innovation that provides multiple paths to most design problems.
The second, related, point is the fact that at least some of the largest firms in the
industry have patent-reviewing practices that undermine the possibility and extent of
interference from issued patents. Executives at more than one of the firms with whom I
spoke indicated that they have routine programs that monitor patents as they are issued,
watching for patents that might write onto products of the firm. It is common for the
lawyers in these programs to discover such patents, and for the firms to respond promptly
to alleviate the problem. Depending on the seriousness of the problem, a range of
obvious responses appear: ignore the patent, on the premise that it is either invalid or
does not extend to the product in question; rewrite the software to avoid the patent; obtain
a license from the patentee; or acquire the patentee (or the patent).
It seems clear that all of these responses (and more complex combinations of
them) are common in the industry. It also is clear that the OSDL group engages in
similar activity with respect to commercially significant open source programs like Linux
and Apache. Collectively, those two points undermine step (IV) of the syllogism above,
because they suggest that however many patents there might be that affect commercially
important open source programs, the likelihood of a serious problem of infringement is
relatively slight.
Still, it is at least plausible that there are patents that might pose problems for
open source programs.154 One highly informed executive, for example, suggested that
there are about 200 crucial patents, access to which is necessary to distribute a modern
operating system. Although that estimate seems quite high, even a much lower estimate
would suggest a serious potential for infringement by open source programs that do not
have access to patented technology. Here, however, is where step (II) of the syllogism
breaks down. As discussed above, the “disdain” argument no longer has any descriptive
force for the modern open source development community. Whatever might be true for
the “hard-core” portions of the community associated with the Free Software Foundation,
nothing could be further from the truth for players like the OSDL group that are fostering
the commercially important open source programs. There is every reason to believe that
those firms will make their patents available to the extent necessary to protect users of
open source software. Indeed, one executive at an OSDL firm suggested that a relatively
common response to the issuance of a third-party patent that affects Linux is for a
member of the OSDL group to grant formal access to a patent necessary to write around
the third-party patent.
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With that information in mind, we might think that the likelihood of a risk of
infringement is about as serious for the commercially important proprietary products
(from firms like Microsoft and Adobe) as it is for open source products. In either case,
the problem will be serious only if the two camps go into an open war enforcing their
patents against each other – an outcome that seems most unlikely under current
conditions, for reasons explained in a related paper155 – or if a party such as a troll that is
outside the existing equilibrium holds the patent. In sum, it certainly is plausible that a
troll could obtain a “nuclear bomb” patent that would write onto major commercial
software platforms. It is hard to say, clear, however, that Linux is categorically more
vulnerable to such an attack than Windows, if only because the OSDL group collectively
has many more patents with which to justify its activities than any single developer of
proprietary products (even Microsoft). A single shared pool among all in the industry
might resist such an attack more readily than the silos of patents that currently exist, but it
is not obvious that one or the other silo is less capable of protecting itself.

V. Conclusion
Some academics see the open source movement as a victim of an excessive IP
system and fear that it cannot co-exist with the commercial development model, which
depends on increasingly large patent portfolios. Others see it as the best antidote for a
broken IP system and hope that it will force software firms to gravitate towards business
models that do not rely on IP protections, even if those models provide lower returns.
Still others see the movement as a case study on the unsuitability of traditional
development models that depend on appropriating the returns to R&D through IP
investments and predict the abandonment of IP-centric development models.
This essay fleshes out those ideas and tests their limits. The foundational claim of
this paper is that the open source model is largely consistent with current economic
theories about optimal ways of leveraging R&D to serve the distinct needs of different
end-user markets. I argue that commercial participants form collaborative development
communities that mirror the more typical firm-based development processes that depend
directly on off-the-shelf IP rules. They do this when it is more efficient to invest in interfirm innovative activities, and they use traditional appropriation mechanisms when intrafirm activities make more sense.
It is difficult to assess whether either model would be more successful without the
influence of the other. Given the lower returns experienced by some of the commercial
participants, there is some reason to believe that firms are being drawn to open source
development as a second-best outcome: as it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain
competitive differentiation with a traditional development structure, open source offers a
promising alternative tactic. The ongoing strategic repositioning renders the structure of
the industry far too fluid to assess that point fully at this time. The most that can be said
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is that there is every reason to believe that the optimal allocation of the different models
depends on the specific technology and markets involved.
Similarly, although the open source model seems to have much to lose from the
patent system, it is far from clear that it would work without it. Many of the principal
participants are large patentees. Those firms continue to develop proprietary hardware
and software products. Patents are an important way to protect the underlying R&D
investments, and increasingly are used to generate licensing revenues. The open source
movement, in turn, depends heavily on the involvement of commercial participants for
legitimacy in the eyes of enterprise users.
In the end, it seems certain that the different models will be forced to co-exist, in a
world in which property rights will continue to matter. In addition, if they continue to coexist, the industry will develop in a different shape than it would without the two models.
I argue here that the industry will be more concentrated and harder to enter. I may be
wrong about that. But if I am right, the rise of commercial open source will have an
effect far different from the vision of its creators.
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